This one is worth watching. With regard to blogs and forums, particularly, there’s a strong analogy with letter-writing and other modes of communication with the “outside” that are typically allowed.

The plaintiffs, two registered California sex offenders, argue that prohibiting their anonymous speech online “even if it pertains to news, politics, and professional activity, and could not possibly be used to commit a crime” violates the First Amendment.

This looks similar to a case I wrote about in October, where a Nebraska federal court tossed a similar law in that state.

I don’t want sex offenders to have access to children online. But these measures do go too far. Maybe registered sex offenders should be required to access the internet via special software that, while it allows anonymity, prevents access to services and sites that reach children.

At the end of the day, the truth is that these laws apply to people who have otherwise served their time, who are “free” in the legal sense, and who no longer labor under the curtailed liberties of institutional imprisonment. That imprisonment is meant to punish them, but also to keep the public safe, to prevent them from moving through public crowds anonymously.

If we have released them from prison, allowing that physical anonymity once again, by what logic do we eliminate their digital anonymity?

I don’t have an answer, but I suspect the issue will reach the Supreme Court sooner rather than later.

Professor David Post of Temple Law served as an expert for the plaintiffs — yes, sex offenders — in this case. His focus, as he points out in his Volokh Conspiracy post, was on the overbroad nature of the statute barring internet use by sex offenders, which he believes, and the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska agreed, was beyond what the First Amendment allows.

Your first thought might be “who cares about a sex offender’s free speech rights?”

The answer, of course, is that the Constitution cares, particularly after they have served prison time and otherwise complied with constitutionally sound penalties for their crimes.

The core of the court’s holding lies in the following passage:

The ban not only restricts the exchange of text between adults; it also restricts the exchange of oral and video communication between adults. Moreover, the ban potentially restricts the targeted offenders from communicating with hundreds of millions and perhaps billions of adults and their companies despite the fact that the communication has nothing whatsoever to do with minors.¹

This looks to me like a well-meaning statute, meant to keep sex offenders away from kids online, that was very poorly drafted. You could achieve the desired goal using far narrower provisions. I hope someone proposes a corrected statute to that effect.